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THE RIGHT AND THE REASONABLE
George P. Fletcher*
As the common law relies on the concept of "reasonableness," the civil
law relies on the concept of "Right." Professor Fletcher argues that reliance
on reasonableness enables the common law to develop rules that can be
voiced in a single standard. Such rules permit what ProfessorFletcherterms
'flat" legal thinking. In contrast, the civil law's reliance on the concept of
Right leads it to develop rules that proceed in two stages: the first rule asserts
an absolute right; the second, a limitation based upon criteria other than
Right. The application of such rules proceeds by what Professor Fletcher
terms "structured" legal thinking. Professor Fletcher demonstrates how the
common law's predilectionfor reasonableness and flat legal thinking has led
it to ignore fundamental distinctions in the criminal law, such as that
between self-defense and putative self-defense. He concludes that the preference for reasonablenessis the expression of a pluralistic legal culture; the
concept of Right, the expression of a monistic one.

W1E lawyers should listen to the way we talk. If we paused to
listen to our pattern of speech, we would be surprised by some

of its distinguishing features. One of the most striking particularities
of our discourse is its pervasive reliance on the term "reasonable."
We routinely refer to reasonable time, reasonable delay, reasonable
reliance, and reasonable care. In criminal law, we talk incessantly of

reasonable provocation, reasonable mistake, reasonable force, and reasonable risk. 1 Within these idioms pulse the sensibilities of the rea-

sonable person.

For all the supposed concreteness of the common

law, we can hardly function without this hypothetical figure at the
center of legal debate. We cannot even begin to argue about most
issues of responsibility and liability without first asking what a hypothetical reasonable person would do under the circumstances.
Our reliance on reasonableness is noteworthy because it distinguishes our legal discourse from legal discourse in other cultures. The

fact is that French, German, and Soviet lawyers argue in a different
idiom. Their languages deploy a concept of reason, and their terms
for "reason" raison, Vernuft and razumnost' readily yield corresponding adjectives. Yet these parallels to our term "reasonable"
do not figure prominently in legal speech on the continent. The

* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
An earlier version of this paper received careful consideration both at a Columbia law faculty
workshop and at a conference on criminal theory held in July 1984 in Freiburg, West Germany.
I am indebted, in particular, to Meir Dan-Cohen, Harold Edgar, Albin Eser, Kent Greenawalt,
and Ginter Stratenwerth for thoughtful comments.
1 The Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Penal Code, and the various restatements
couple the adjective "reasonable" and the adverb "reasonably" with over ioo different words.
One example of this is the phrase "reasonable force," which appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 63(I), 77, 97, 101, 147(2), i5o (1965).
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French civil code uses the term raisonnable precisely once; 2 the German and Soviet civil codes do not use the term at all.3 The criminal
codes - the natural habitat of the reasonable person - are barren
of these derivatives of reason. 4 In the civil codes, we see a variety
of standards of care: in France, the conduct expected of a bon pore
de famille;s in West Germany, the "care necessary in the particular
transaction"; 6 and in Soviet legislation, "foreseeing a socially dangerous consequence that one should have foreseen." 7 Reasonable mistakes are also treated in a different lexicon. The adjectives describing
a faultless mistake in these languages do not translate as "reasonable"
but as "invincible," 8 "unavoidable," 9 and "non-negligent."' 0 All these
emanations of the reasonable person find diverse translations in continental legal discourse, a distinct word for every context.
In continental Europe, neither the adjective "reasonable" nor the
figure of the "reasonable person" matters much in casting a legal
argument. Whatever we sense as the common denominator underlying "reasonable reliance" and "reasonable mistake" is lost in continental legal debate. Whether we think differently from our European
counterparts is not so easily assayed. That we speak differently,
however, is quite clear.
In my view, it is no accident that we pervasively rely upon the
concept of reasonableness while Europeans do not. This pattern of
our speech serves a purpose, perhaps many purposes. I will consider
some of these possible purposes and then bring the analysis to bear
on the specific problem of reasonable mistakes in the criminal law.
I. Two

STYLES OF LEGAL REASONING

How should we go about developing an account of the common
law's affection for reasonableness? I suggest that we listen carefully
2 CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] art. 1112 (Fr.) (defining undue influence on a party to a contract by
appealing to the impressions of une personne raisonnable).
3 See BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (W. Ger.); CIVIL CODE (RSFSR) (the Russian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic code serves as a model for those of the other Soviet republics).
4 See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] (W. Ger.); CRIMINAL CODE (RSFSR).
S C. cIv. art. 1137 (an obligation to oversee a chattel in one's charge entails a duty to
exercise the care of a bon p~re de famille - literally, "good father of the family"); cf. CODICE
CIVILE [C.c.] arts. 1001, 1176 (Italy) (using the analogous term in Italian - buon padre di
famiglia).
6 BGB § 276 (defining negligence as the failure to exercise die im Verkehr erforderliche
Sorgfalt).
7 CRIMINAL CODE (RSFSR) § 9.
8 G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, DROIT P9NAL GNItRAL 316 (9th ed. 1976). But note that
this passage also refers to mistakes that any homme raisonnable et prudent would have made
under the circumstances.
9STGB § 17 (literally, the actor lacks "culpability" if he "could not avoid" his mistake about
a legal prohibition).
10 2 KuRs SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA ["Course in Soviet Criminal Law"] 358 (A.
Piontovsky et al. eds. 1970).
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to the way in which French, German, and Soviet lawyers discuss legal
issues. We should heed not only the language of legislation and of
judicial opinions, but also the style of argument in textbooks, treatises,
and the theoretical literature. Our aim in this empirical quest should
be to isolate features of European discourse that are as prominent in
their context as our pervasive reliance on reasonableness. Limiting
our inquiry to German legal discourse, we find a number of terms not readily translatable - that figure almost as prominently in legal
German as does reasonableness in legal English. Consider the terms
Treu und Glauben (good faith and fair dealing)," Recht (objective
Right), 12 Rechtsmissbrauch (abuse of personal rights), 13 and Zumutbarkeit (fair expectability).1 4 Whether one of these terms is as significant in German discourse as reasonableness is in English does not
depend on frequency alone. The question is whether one or more of
these terms signals a deeper, structural feature of German legal
thought.
The argument in the offing is that the concept of Right (Recht)
shapes ,German legal thought as reasonableness directs common law
reasoning. In order to develop this argument, I need first to introduce
and clarify a distinction between two types of legal discourse, which,
for want of better terms, I shall call "flat"' 5 and "structured." Flat
legal discourse proceeds in a single stage, marked by the application
of a legal norm that invokes all of the criteria relevant to the resolution
of a dispute. Structured legal discourse proceeds in two stages: first,
an absolute norm is asserted; and second, qualifications enter to restrict the scope of the supposedly dispositive norm.
This distinction is readily grasped in context. Consider the problem of imposing limits on the right to use force in preventing encroachment on one's rights. German law approaches this problem in
11See BGB § 242 (establishing the general principle that obligors must fulfill their obligations
according to the dictates of Treu und Glauben). This provision has become the source of a
general jurisprudence of equity and reciprocal fairness in the execution of contractual relationships.
12On the distinction between Recht and Gesetz and its significance, see 4 W. FIKENTSCHER,

METHODEN DES RECHTS 328 (1977), and Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J.
970, 980-84 (ig8i).

13 Although the Birgerliches Gesetzbuch never uses the word Rechtsmissbrauch, and the
Code civil never uses the phrase abus de droit, these doctrines limiting the exercise of private

rights are clearly recognized in both German and French law. See, e.g., i L. ENNECCERUS,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 1439-43 (H. Nipperdey rev. x5th ed. 1959);
E6rsi, Rechtsmuissbrauch und funktionsnissige Rechtsausubung im Westen und Osten, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECETSVERGLEICHUNG 30, 39-4o (1965); Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22 (1935).
14 See STGB § 35(1) (a wrongful act will not be excused on grounds of necessity or duress
if abstention from that act is "fairly expectable" under the circumstances).
15 The term "flat" may strike some readers as pejorative. It is hard to find a neutral term.
Professor Albin Eser of Freiburg, West Germany, has usefully suggested to me the term "holistic"
to capture the self-contained quality of flat legal reasoning. Yet "holistic" seems too mystical
and thus, for some, too approving.
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the -style of structured legal discourse. According to the criminal code
of 197516 (as well as the superseded code of 187117), everyone who
suffers an unjustified invasion of her rights has an absolute privilege
to use whatever force is necessary to thwart the invasion. If the only
way to stop a fleeing thief, even a child stealing fruit, is to shoot the
thief, the courts1 8 and the scholars 19 have supported the property
owner's right to use deadly force. Countering this trend, some postwar commentators 20 and courts2 1 have invoked the principle of "abuse
of rights" to limit this right at a second stage of analysis. 22 At the
first level, there remains an absolute right to use deadly force when
necessary; at the second level, the exercise of that right comes under
scrutiny. If the right is exercised at excessive cost, it is thought to be
"abused" and therefore inoperative. Nothing in the criminal code
supports this restriction. Nonetheless, the method of structured legal
thought permits an additional level of argument, a level where extrastatutory considerations can limit the explicit provisions of the code.
16 STGB § 32.
17 STGB § 53 (repealed in 1975).
18 See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 20, 192o, Reichsgericht, Ger., 55 Reichsgericht in Strafsachen
[RGSt] 82. The defendant shot and wounded fruit thieves. The Supreme Court affirmed the
acquittal, reasoning that Right should prevail "in the struggle against anti-Right." Id. at 85.
19 See, e.g., Himmelreich, Nothilfe und Notwehr: insbesondere zur sog. Interessenabwiigung,
2I MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 361, 363-64 (1967); Stratenwerth, Prinzipien der
Rechtfertigung, 68 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 41, 6o (1956)
(noting that the dominant scholarly opinion in Germany rejected balancing the interests of the
victim against those of the aggressor).
20 See, e.g., Baumann, Rechtsmissbrauch bei Notwehr, I6 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES
RECHT 349 (1962); Schaffstein, Notwehr und Gfiterabwiigungsprinzip, 6 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR
DEUTSCHES RECHT 132, 135 (1952). Some current treatises and textbooks are noncommittal
about the grounds for limiting the right of self-defense. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS 279 (3d ed. 1978); K. LACKNER, STRAFGEZETZBUCH 175 (15th ed. 1983).
One commentator has rejected "abuse of right" as too vague a formulation, arguing that the
limitation on the right of one family member to use necessary force in self-defense against
another should be based on a theory analogous to the duty to aid a family member in distress.
K. MARXEN, DIE "SOZIALETHISCHEN" GRENZEN DER NOTWEHR 57 (1979) (making an analogy
to STGB § 13). This theory also proceeds in two stages: first, a recognition of the absolute right
to use defensive force and, second, a duty to forgo rightful force in light of a relationship with
the aggressor.
21 See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1963, Oberlandesgericht, Bavaria, x6 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 824. The defendant attempted to frighten a woman out of a parking
spot by driving toward her. On the defendant's plea of self-defense, the court found that
although the driver had a right to the parking spot, he had used a degree of force that was
excessive and therefore an "abuse of right". This doctrine was invoked more recently in
Judgment of Nov. 24, 1976, Oberlandesgericht, Hamm, 30 NJW 590, 592.
22 Some writers favor a limitation on self-defense without utilizing a two-stage analysis.
They derive such a limitation directly from the statutory condition in STGB § 32 that selfdefense be required (geboten) under the circumstances. See Lenckner, "Gebotensein" und "Erforderlichkeit" der Notwehr, 1968 GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT I; Roxin, Die
"sozialethischen Einschriinkungen" des Notwehrrechts, 93 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT

68, 79 (1981).
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In contrast, common law discourse typically avoids this bifurcation. We have no inclination to say, first, that the defending party
has an absolute right to use all force necessary to vindicate his autonomy, and second, that invoking this right in particular circumstances
would abuse it.23 The advantage of the single term "reasonable" is
that it packs into the initial norm criteria that are the same as or
similar to those invoked in assessing "abuse of rights" at a secondary
level of argument. The upshot of collapsing the two dimensions of
argument is that the privilege of self-defense is no longer absolute. It
is limited at the outset by the concept of reasonableness.
The structured style of legal argument is also expressed in the
limitations imposed on the use of private property. At the first level
of argument, private property is asserted to be absolute; at the second
level, the right to use one's property is "abused" if others are affected
too adversely. 24 Like the two-level analysis of self-defense, this structure collapses into one principle: everyone has the right to the reason25
able use of his or her property.
In view of this account of structured and flat legal thinking, we
can see that our reliance on reasonableness facilitates fiat legal thinking. With syntactically mobile modifiers like "reasonable" and "substantial," each rule of the common law can contain placeholders for
everything that one needs to know to resolve a particular problem.
Of course, the addition of open-ended modifiers sacrifices both the
apparent precision and the apparent absoluteness of the stated rule.
But a sophisticated American lawyer would presumably respond that
these ostensible virtues of German law are illusory and that it is better
to work with vague and qualified, but at least non-deceptive, legal
norms. Structured and flat legal analysis each have their appeal. If
they did not, they would hardly find expression in two of the world's
leading legal cultures. Though my sympathies lie with the clarity
gained from structured legal analysis, my primary purpose here is to
probe the rhetorical and substantive differences expressed in these
diverse modes of legal thinking.
Before turning to other examples drawn from American and Ger23 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(I) (1965) (an actor may use "reasonable
force" to defend himself when he "reasonably believes" that another intends to attack him);

W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 391 (1972).
24 One set of restrictions on the use of property - the area of law we call "nuisance" represents a core instance of "abuse of right." See E6rsi, supra note 13, at 32-33 (discussing

the common law's transition from absolute to restricted rights of property). Article 544 of the
Code civil provides: "Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing in the most absolute
manner possible, provided that one does not thereby engage in a usage prohibited by law"

(author's translation).

This provision is commonly thought to be the one that most closely

approximates the notion of "abuse of rights." See supra note 13 (discussing abus de droit).
25 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 626-27 (5th ed. i984) (treating "substantial and unreasonable interference" as

the basis for the law of nuisance).
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man law, let me qualify the present state of the argument with two
points. First, the thesis as presently stated represents but the first
approximation of a full account of the common law attachment to
reasonableness. There is more to be said in refining the argument,
particularly by way of connecting the concept of reasonableness with
the basic ideas of German legal theory. Second, the concept of reasonableness is not the only factor that facilitates flat legal thinking in
the common law. Other open-ended modifiers such as "substantial"
permit us to formulate norms that incorporate unarticulated qualifying
criteria into the statement of the rule.
A. Justification and Excuse
Let us now look at the way in which our ubiquitous invocation of
the reasonable person enables us to function without the fundamental
distinction between justification and excuse. This distinction is basic
in German criminal law. It was also indispensable to the common
law of homicide as understood by Blackstone. 26 Today, however,
only' those common law theorists who read and respect the philosophical literature have high regard for the distinction.
The distinction between justification and excuse is not particularly
difficult to understand. Claims of justification concern the rightness,
or at least the legal permissibility, 27 of an act that nominally violates
the law. If generally impermissible conduct is justified on grounds,
say, of self-defense, lesser evil, consent, or the interests of law enforcement, the act is one that ought to prevail in a situation of conflict.
No one is entitled to defend against a justified act, and third parties
are permitted, indeed encouraged, to assist the justified actor. 28
Excuses speak not to the rightness or desirability of the act but to
the personal culpability of the actor. Excuses come into consideration
only if it is first decided that some untoward (wrongful or unlawful)
act requires excusing.2 9 If an excuse, such as insanity, involuntary
26 Blackstone defined murder as "all homicide. . . , unless where justified by the command
or permission of the law; excused on a principle of accident or self-preservation; or alleviated
into manslaughter." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201. The reliance on these common

law categories survives in criminal codes enacted in the nineteenth-century, such as CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 187-,99 (West Supp. 1985).
27 For a thoughtful discussion of the question whether "justification" means "rightful" or
"tolerable," see Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law:
A Critique of Fletcher'sThinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. Rv. 6x, 83-91 (1984). I address
this issue on pp. 119-23.
28 In an important recent article, Kent Greenawalt challenges the notion that one may infer
from society's approval of an act the rights of other parties either to resist or to assist the act.
See Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justificationand Excuse, 84 COLUm. L. REV. 1897,
I919-21 (1984).
29 This conceptual precondition of excusing is apparent in the American Law Institute's
increasingly influential definition of insanity as an actor's lack of "substantial capacity . . . to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01() (Pro-
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intoxication, duress, or mistake of law, applies in the case, the untowardness of the act remains unchallenged. 30 Yet the excuse implies
that the actor is not personally to blame for the untoward act. Claims
of justification direct our attention to the propriety of the act in the
abstract; claims of excuse, to the blameworthiness of the actor in the
concrete situation.
The distinction between justification and excuse is of fundamental
theoretical and practical value. In framing a theory of liability or a
rational criminal code, 3 1 one would presumably inquire whether a
particular defense addresses itself to the propriety of the act or to the
personal culpability of the actor. Yet the distinction has gone unmentioned in most of the English language textbooks of the last hundred
years. 32 The indifference to the distinction emerges clearly in the
33
recently published, four-volume Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,
edited by Sanford Kadish. This work captures orthodox American
sentiments toward criminal law as well as any document of the last
two decades. Virtually everyone active and prominent in the field has
contributed an article on some issue of criminal justice. The articles
are not particularly original, nor are they meant to be. They are
designed to reflect the way the American professoriat thinks about
criminal law, criminal procedure, and related fields in the early i98os.
The Encyclopedia provides a window to orthodox thinking on these
issues.
True, the Encyclopedia does acknowledge recent philosophical

34
But a surwork in structuring the defenses that bear on liability.

prising number of articles pay no attention to how particular defenses
might be construed differently if treated as justifications, excuses, or
jurisdictional exemptions from liability. George Dix writes about selfdefense without addressing the question whether the function of the
35 Yet
defense is to justify aggressive conduct or merely to excuse it.
posed Official Draft 1962). The issue of capacity arises only if it is first determined that the act
is "wrongful" or "criminal."
30 The finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity" implicitly affirms the "wrongfulness" or
"criminality" of the act. See supra note 29. Unless the act is wrongful, it would be incoherent
to say that the actor lacked capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act.
31 The Model Penal Code does distinguish between claims of justification and other defenses,
see MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3; but these "other" defenses are dispersed between article 2
(duress, mistake) and article 4 (insanity).
32 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 23, at 356 - 413 (using "justification" and
"excuse" interchangeably); J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 155-211 (4 th ed. 1978)
(ignoring distinction in discussion of "general defenses").
33 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (S. Kadish ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as ENCYCLOPEDIA].

34 See Fingarette & Hasse, Excuse: Intoxication, in 2 ENCYLCOPEDIA, supra note 33, at
942; Fletcher, Justification:Theory, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 941; Fletcher, Excuse:
Theory, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 724; Morawetz, Justification: Necessity, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 957.

3sDix, Justification:Self-Defense, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 946. Although the
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the case law on self-defense contains strains of both theories; 36 and
one would analyze particular issues, such as third-party defense 3 7 and
the duty to retreat, 38 differently depending on whether the rationale
of the defense is taken to be one of justification or of excuse. Martin
Levine, who otherwise writes thoughtfully about duress, passes too
quickly over the relevance of justification and excuse. 3 9 In arguing
for the extension of duress to homicide cases, he neglects to analyze
how the resolution of that issue depends on whether duress is classified
as a justification or an excuse. 40 Abraham Goldstein writes, about
insanity, 4 1 but fails to discuss whether the defense functions as a
jurisdictional exemption from liability, by analogy to infancy, or as2
4
an excuse from liability, by analogy to involuntary intoxication.
Steven Duke surveys the law of superior orders, 43 but with indifference to the basic and rich question whether reliance on superior orders
serves to justify the conduct or merely to excuse it.44 Hyman Gross
editors classified self-defense as a justification, there is no evidence that this judgment affected
the writer's thinking about the issue. The same criticism applies to the articles cited in notes
39, 41 & 43.
36

See

G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 856-58 (1978).

37 If self-defense is a justification, the right to use force is readily universalized ex ante to
include anyone in a position to intervene; if it is an excuse, the defense is applied ex post
exclusively on behalf of the defender. See id. at 868-69.
38 If self-defense is regarded as a justification because it vindicates autonomy, the duty to
retreat is not likely to apply; if self-defense is merely an excuse, then retreat is a precondition
to establishing that the defender had "his back to the wall" and "had to kill." See id. at 86468.
39 Levine, Excuse: Duress, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 729. More than other
writers criticized in this Section, Levine recognizes the conflicting rationales for a defense, some
justificatory and others excusatory in nature. See id. at 729-3o. He blurs the distinction,
however, by assuming that characterizing duress either as a justification or as an excuse would
support extension of the defense to homicide cases. Id. at 731. As a result, he fails to appreciate
the need to conceptualize duress as an excuse if one is to apply the defense even in cases of
killing an innocent person. See infra note 40.
40 Justifying the taking of innocent life ex ante is virtually impossible for anyone except a
thorough-going utilitarian; in contrast, excusing the killing ex post does not violate a moral
commitment to the sanctity of human life. See Lynch v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1975]
i All E.R. 913, 930 (H.L.) (recognizing, in the case of a defendant who aided and abetted IRA
assassination, that the presence or absence of duress is a question of fact for the jury).
41 Goldstein, Excuse: Insanity, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 735.
42 If insanity functions as an exemption from jurisdiction in the same way that infancy does,
see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 134-35 (1968), it should be considered
prior to the proof of the wrongful act; if insanity is an excuse, its consideration presupposes
proof of a wrongful act. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 836-39; supra notes 29-30.
43 Duke, Excuse: Superior Orders, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 745.
4 Whether acting under superior orders is conceived of as a justification or as an excuse
might affect the following issues: (i) whether the party victimized by the ordered act has a right
to resist; (2) whether third parties not given orders have a right to assist the defendants given
orders; and (3) whether, under German law STGB § 17, the ordered defendant's unavoidable
belief that the order is lawful is an excusable mistake of law. German law treats the issue of
lawful orders as a problem of justification. See A. SCHONKE, H. SCHEODER, & T. LENCKNER,
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writes of recent American developments in mistake of law,4 5 but fails
to analyze the plausible analogies between mistake of law and other
46
excuses for violating the law.

There are two perspectives from which one might assess the indifference of these five established scholars to the theory of justification
and excuse. If I were to engage one of them in debate, I would argue
that his analysis of the particular defense is superficial. It fails to
grapple with the theoretical and practical implications of explicating
the basic rationale for the particular defense. The analysis of all five
issues - self-defense, duress, insanity, superior orders, and mistake
of law - is enhanced by probing whether the defense sounds in the
theory of justification, of excuse, or possibly of jurisdiction (as might
be the case with insanity). It appears that these five writers simply
fail to respond to available arguments in the field. One has the same
reaction to them as one would have to an article written today about
tort theory that failed to acknowledge the implications of the economic
analysis of law.
It is possible, however, to assume a posture of detachment toward
the implicit orthodoxy of the Encyclopedia and to view these articles
as a phenomenon of intellectual history. The question that arises,
then, is not whether they are right or wrong, sophisticated or unsophisticated, but a question of a different order: how do these writers
analyze the criminal law without attending to a distinction that both
German theorists and contemporary American analytic philosophers
regard as fundamental? 4 7 My answer to this query will take us back
to the point of departure: the pervasive reliance in American law on
the concept of reasonableness and flat legal thinking. Yet we need
first to clarify the difference between cultivating distinctions and structuring legal thought.
B. Structured Argument
Distinctions do not themselves generate structured legal thinking.
One could, for example, follow J.L. Austin in cultivating the conceptual line between mistakes and accidents. 48 This would lead us to
perceive two strands of negligence. One form of negligence would
consist in causing harm by faultful accident; the other, in acting on
the basis of a faultful misperception of the world. Yet these distinct
STRAFGESETZBUCH 426-27 (2oth ed. 198o). The Encyclopedia gives no indication why the issue
is categorized as an excuse.
45 Gross, Mistake, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at io66.
46 The analogy is important, for it explains why the mistake of law must be made without
fault in order to count as a good defense. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at 707-12, 73649.
47 See sources cited supra note' 34 and infra note 48.
48 See Austin, A Pleafor Excuses, 57 PRoc. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y I, 1o-1i (1956).
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tracks of analysis would not yield a lexical ordering, 4 9 an insistence
that one dimension of the argument precede another.
How, then, does the distinction between justification and excuse
generate a structured form of legal argument? This is not so easily
perceived, for in fact, the importance of the distinction lies in its
mirror image: in the affirmative concepts negated by each claim. A
justification negates an assertion of wrongful conduct. An excuse
negates a charge that the particular defendant is personally to blame
for the wrongful conduct. Although the defendant might have intentionally acted in violation of the law, he is not personally to blame
for an unjustified violation if he acted under duress, while insane, or
under certain types of mistake about the law. The structure that is
implicit in this way of stating the analysis of liability ("excuses for
unjustified violations") is that the concept of wrongful conduct logically precedes the concept of personal culpability.5 0 The analysis of
justification must precede the analysis of excuse.
The question that properly engages us, therefore, is whether this
ordering of the issues is logically compelled. In analyzing a problem
of liability, might one not first consider an allegation of excuse, say
of insanity or involuntary intoxication, and later a problem of selfdefense or justified use of force in making an arrest? Why should not
the issue of responsibility (as American lawyers often label the issue
of personal blameworthiness) be the very first issue considered in
analyzing liability?
For German lawyers, it seems natural to consider the issue of
wrongfulness and then of responsibility (a W/R ordering). German
textbooks do not even pause to justify the ordering. Yet even if we
accept a clear distinction between the issues of wrongfulness (the
absence of justification) and of responsibility (the absence of excuse),
two other logical relationships between these issues are possible. It
might be the case either (i) that one must inquire into responsibility
before wrongfulness (an R/W ordering), or (2) that no ordering of the
two sets of issues is compelled. The latter possibility reflects the
orientation of flat legal thinking. Consistently with my general thesis,
I will attempt to show that an aversion to all ordering characterizes
the orthodox American view toward analyzing criminal liability.
First, however, I wish to consider the possibility of an R/W ordering
and then account for the acceptance of the W/R ordering as a matter
of course in German law.
r. The RIW Ordering. - There is some support in the common
law tradition for the logical priority of the issue of responsibility over
49 Rawis appears to have coined this term in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (197), in
which he defines "lexical order" as "an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle
before we move on to the second, the second before we consider the third, and so on." Id. at
422-23.

SOFor development of this point with regard to insanity, see notes 29-30.
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the issue of wrongdoing. The first issue for consideration should be
whether the defendant is an addressee of the applicable legal norm.
If an infant, the defendant is not a subject of the norm. If he is
psychotic, or if, in the language of the common law, he behaves like
a "wild beast," he should be treated like an infant - as someone who
falls outside the scope of the criminal law. The analogy holds, more
or less, for the criminally. insane. But it is difficult to make the same
claim for duress, involuntary intoxication, and mistake of law. Nonetheless this approach of the common law is still on the statute books.
Section 26 of the California Penal Code lists six categories of persons
who are not "capable of committing crimes."' l The first two categories are infants and idiots. The last four are defined as follows:
Three - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged
under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal
intent.
Four - Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.
Five - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged
through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was
no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.
Six Persons (unless the crime be .punishable with death) who
committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or
menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and
52
did believe that their lives would be endangered if they refused.
The contents of categories three, five, and six obviously diverge
from the subject of the provision: persons incapable of committing
crimes. The issues of mistake, accident, and duress speak not to the
questions of the capacity of the actor, but to the way in which an act
is performed. Those who invoke these excuses are unquestionably
"capable of committing crimes," but they cannot fairly be held accountable for the particular act- at issue.
53
There are some traces of an R/W ordering in the common law,
but as the California Code indicates, this ordering treats responsibility
as equivalent to the general issue of personal capacity. If, in contrast,
51CAL. PENAL

CODE § 26 (West Supp. 1985).

52 Id.
S3The adjudication of strict liability claims might appear to entail an R/W ordering, but
this is because strict liability dispenses with the question of wrongdoing altogether. See, e.g.,
Western Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Mason, 24o Ark. 767, 402 S.W.2d 657 (1966) (liability for
blasting accident); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 52oA (1977)(liability for ground damage
due to airplane crashes). Activities subject to strict liability in tort are socially acceptable and
nonenjoinable. One might also attempt to interpret strict criminal liability as an affirmation of
responsibility without wrongfulness. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(x943). Yet, although one might construe tort liablity as a nonjudgmental tax on doing business,
criminal punishment is designed to condemn violations of the law. If a violation is not wrongful,
it is hard to see the point of criminal condemnation.
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responsibility is negated by excuses, then a finding of wrongful conduct logically precedes the consideration of possible excuses. This is
the conceptual relationship that I shall now try to explicate.
2. The WIR Ordering. The analysis of justificatory claims logically precedes the consideration of excuses only if the corresponding
affirmative concepts are ordered in the same way: W/R, with responsibility (R) understood as referring not to the actor's general capacity,
but to his culpability or blameworthiness for engaging in a particular
act. Two arguments support the logical priority of wrongdoing over
responsibility. The first is conceptual and draws on the implicit meaning of "excusing."
Excuses make sense only in the context of precluding blame and
thus presuppose the possibility of blame. It makes no sense to "excuse" natural events such as a rainfall or an avalanche; these events
raise no question of blame because there is no person to be held
responsible. Nor do excuses perform their function when applied to
beneficial acts, because again there is nothing to blame and therefore
nothing to excuse. It would thus seem that the inquiry about blame
and excuses is limited to harmful human acts. There must be something untoward for which the actor can coherently be blamed.
Among human actions, only those that warrant a prima facie
negative evaluation require our attention. In the specific case of legal
violations, a prima facie negative evaluation follows from the breach
of a legal prohibition. This prima facie evaluation is subject to rebuttal in cases of justification. If the violation is justified, say on
grounds of self-defense, lesser evils, or consent, the act is, on balance,
right and good. It no longer has the negative evaluation necessary to
render excuses relevant. There would be no more point in blaming
or excusing a justified act than there would be in blaming or excusing
a beneficial act. The justification sanctifies the act and renders excuses
irrelevant.
All of this is plausible, one might concede, but it does not prove
that the analysis of justificatory claims logically precedes the analysis
of excuses. Why not consider the issues in this order: (i) violation of
a statutory prohibition; (2) blame and excuse; and then (3) possible
justification? This is a sensible challenge that poses the problem
whether the violation of a statutory prohibition and the negative
evaluation that it implies are sufficient, without a finding of wrongdoing, to make excusing a relevant issue. If so, it would be plausible
to consider the excusability of a violation prior to its justifiability.
This argument has particular force so far as our criminal statutes
conform closely to our moral norms. Because violations of these
statutes carry strong negative implications, excuses can then come into
play. Implicitly, this is to argue that the violation of a morally sound
prohibition raises a strong presumption of wrongful conduct. Yet,
this presumption is subject to refutation by a claim of justification.
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If the violation of the prohibition and the question of justification
both bear on the wrongfulness of the act, it makes little sense to split
the issues and consider them, respectively, at the first and third stages
of the inquiry. As a matter of legal bookkeeping, one might consider
claims of excuse prior to those of justification. But a method conforming to the logical structure of the matter would first consider all
issues bearing on the negative assessment that renders both blaming
and excusing relevant.
So far, the argument for the logical priority of wrongdoing has
proceeded as a conceptual inquiry. The claim has been that the W/R
ordering inheres in the nature of excusing. A second argument derives
from retributive theories of punishment. These theories - as opposed
to those that stress social protection - hold, simply, that punishment
should be imposed for wrongdoing. Retribution requires that offenders be punished for their wrongs in order to rectify the imbalance
represented by the unpunished wrong. The manner in which the
punishment counterbalances the wrong might be mystical in the Hegelian sense.5 4 It might follow from the Kantian approach of universalizing the wrong.5 5 Or it might take on the modern slant one
finds in the work of Herbert Morris: the punishment rectifies the
maldistribution of benefits and burdens brought about by the commission of the crime.5 6 In each type of retributive theory, the primary
issue is wrongdoing. The gravity of the wrong determines the maximum severity of the punishment. The punishment might be reduced
in case of partial blameworthiness,5 7 or eliminated in cases of blameless or excused conduct. The need to consider wrongfulness before
responsibility follows from the structure of retributive thinking. The
first inquiry is whether there is a wrong to be punished and, if so,
how grievous it is. The second inquiry, whether the punishment
should be mitigated, arises in considering whether the actor should
be excused or should be punished to the full extent of her wrong.
The argument for mitigation might well be that the actor had
incomplete control over the unfolding of the crime. The less control
the actor has, the less his blame for the act. The diminution of control
might result either from external pressures or from the actor's psycho54 See G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 97, at 69 (T. Knox trans. 1952).
ss See I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).

Kant had several distinct arguments justifying punishment, all of which focus on the wrong
done. Among them is his claim that thieves should be punished as though they had made
thievery a universal law, rendering the thieves themselves destitute. Id. at 102.
56 See H. MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31, 33-34

(1976).
57 This point is well expressed in the formula devised by Robert Nozick, in which the amount
of punishment is determined by r X H. H represents the wrong and r the degree of responsibility
or blameworthiness. H is, in principle, unlimited, but r varies only between o and I. In a
case of excused conduct, r equals o. See R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-66

(1981).
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logical condition. In cases of duress and personal necessity, such as
breaking out of prison to avoid a homosexual rape, the actor's control
over his actions is so far reduced that blaming him for wrongful
conduct offends our sense of justice. Similarly, involuntary intoxication and insanity, at least in the conventional understanding of these
states, reflect internal loss of control to an extent that makes blaming
unjust. The analysis of mistake of law follows the same mode of
reasoning: so far as someone does not know that his conduct might
be wrongful, he can hardly be said to have control over a wrongful
act he might commit. These remarks represent but the first cut at a
difficult set of issues. Nonetheless, they point to a general account of
excuses.
My analysis of excuses will remain at the superficial level of argument,5 8 for the point of these remarks is simply to demonstrate the
secondary nature of blame and excuse in analyzing liability. The
theory of retributive punishment invites us to consider the relative
desert of the offender, but only after establishing that he is an offender
who has committed a wrongful act. The issues of blaming and excusing make sense only if we inquire: blameworthy or excusable for
what? The "what" in this question requires us to specify the untoward
act that makes the notions of blame and excuse meaningful.
3. The Non-ordering: W or R - In a culture stressing flat legal
reasoning, one would not expect to find either an R/W or a W/R
ordering. And indeed we do not. The Model Penal Code - a vestige
of the 195o's but still an orthodox document - makes no mention of
either ordering. The provision defining a "material element of an
offense" treats the absence of justification and excuse on a par with
criteria defining the prima facie case of liability.5 9 The Code adopts
the model of flat legal reasoning. All elements are of equal significance. If any element, be it affirmative or negative, is absent, the
defendant is not guilty. It is of little importance whether we analyze
the elements in any particular order, so long as we check them all
before imposing liability.
C. Flat Legal Reasoning
Reasonableness - the ubiquitous modifier - provides the lever
for this flattening of liability. The reasonable person enables us to
blur the line between justification and excuse, between wrongfulness
and blameworthiness, and thus renders impossible any ordering of the
dimensions of liability. The standard "what would a reasonable person do under the circumstances?" sweeps within one inquiry questions
that would otherwise be distinguished as bearing on wrongfulness or
58 For further elaboration of the theory of excuses, see Fletcher, Rights and Excuses, CRIM.
JUST. ETHIcs, Summer-Fall 1984, at 17.
59 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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on blameworthiness. Criteria both of justification and of excuse are
amenable to the same question. Concerning the justification of selfdefense, we ask what amount of force a reasonable person would use.
The inquiry is similar in analyzing the excuse of duress. We ask
whether it is reasonable to rob a bank to avoid being killed, 60 or to
escape from jail in order to avoid a homosexual rape. 61 Herbert
Fingarette ingeniously argues that the key element in duress is that
' 62
the defendant's act is "wrongfully made the reasonable thing to do."
The same formula works for self-defense. The aggressor wrongfully
makes it reasonable for the victim of aggression to use force in selfdefense. In this verbal matrix, we can slide back and forth between
63
the criteria of justification and of excuse with the greatest of ease.
I have argued, however, that Germans accept the W/R ordering
not as a matter of policy, but because it is logically compelled both
by the nature of excusing and the structure of retributive punishment.
If this is true, we need to account for the failure of these considerations
to entrench the W/R ordering in common law thinking. The two
reasons for the German W/R ordering are not as distinct as they might
seem. Excuses have a secondary status only if we assume the priority
of wrongdoing in the analysis of punishment. But if punishment has
some purpose other than censuring wrongdoing, then this relationship
of logical priority might collapse.
65
Since the writings of Bentham 64 and the translation of Beccaria,
English legal theorists have been skeptical about censuring wrongdoing as an end in itself. The duty to punish the guilty does not comport
with the Anglo-American quest for a productive purpose in every
social practice. Inflicting injustice offends us. But doing justice for
its own sake does not compel us. Although English and American
lawyers might well believe that punishing the innocent is wrong, there
are fewer votes for the Kantian principle that we have a categorical
duty to punish the guilty. 66 According to the dominant view today,
the requirement of blameworthiness functions at most as a limit on
punishment carried out for the sake of deterrence and other social

60 According to § 2.09(i) of the Model Penal Code, the defense of duress applies only if a
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(I)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

person of "reasonable firmness" is unable to resist the threat.

61 See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827, iu8 Cal. Rptr. 1iO, 112 (i974)
(holding that escape was "the only viable and reasonable choice available').
62 Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue Influence,
and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (forthcoming 1985).
63 See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 560 (1972).
64 See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
170-203 (1823 & photo, reprint 1973) (Ist ed. Oxford 1789).
65 See C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (2d ed. London 1769) (ist ed. London
1767).
66 See I. KANT, supra note 55, at 102.
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goals. 67

Yet, in a spirit of democratic tolerance, we loathe leaving
out either the Kantians or the utilitarians. 68 We pick and choose
among the purposes of punishment as we see fit. 6 9 In this tolerant
muddle, we naturally fail to generate the logical two-stage structure
of analysis that follows from a commitment to punishing the guilty as
an imperative of justice.
It is not surprising, then, that orthodox common law theorists
make so little of the distinctions between wrongdoing and responsibility, justification and excuse. These issues bear with equal force on
the objective of social control. We should have little trouble picking
up distinctions so easily stated, but we think and argue on a bedrock
of instrumental concerns that renders these distinctions little more
than philosophical curiosities.
11. THE CONCEPT OF RIGHT
We would hardly arrive at the concept of Right simply by seeking
translations in particular contexts of the ubiquitous term "reasonable."
Yet if we pay attention to those points of legal debate where flat legal
thinking in the idiom of reasonableness corresponds to structured legal
thinking in German law, we might be surprised at how often we
encounter the notion of Right in German discourse. The concept of
Right, then, becomes a candidate for the systemic equivalent of reasonableness. By "systemic equivalent," I mean to refer to a concept
in German law that is as basic as reasonableness is in the common
law and is pivotal in a system of structured legal thought that functions without the leveling effect generated by the reasonable person.
In the two issues from the criminal law that we have been discussing - the scope of self-defense and the distinction between justification and excuse - the concept of Right provides the wedge for
breaking the German analysis into distinct, lexically-ordered levels of
discourse. I wish to explain how this is so and to draw some inferences about structured legal argument in a system of Right.
We need at least a tentative account of what the Germans mean
by Recht; the French, by droit; and the Russians, by pravo. These
67 The most popular version of this view is the thesis that criteria of desert and retribution
function as a desirable limitation on the pursuit of utilitarian goals. See F. ALLEN, THE
DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIvE IDEAL 71-72 (ig8i); H. PACKER, supra note 42, at 58-62.
68 See B. AcKEPfAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 41-87 (1977) (discussing
both Kantian and utilitarian theories as examples of comprehensive views). Unfortunately, the
view that a sound proposal must satisfy opposed standards (for instance, those of Kant and
Bentham) has gained increasing currency. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 27, at 81-83.
69 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § I.02(I)(C) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (one purpose of
the Code, among others, is "to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as
criminal"); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
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terms express a normative concept of just or sound law. Each legal
system also has a term expressing a descriptive concept of enacted
law: Gesetz, loi, and zakon. The normative principles of Right acquire
their binding force from their intrinsic moral appeal. That no person
should be a judge in his own case, that no one should profit from his
own wrong, that no innocent person should be punished - these are
all readily accepted principles of Right recognized in the common law
as well as in other Western legal systems. By contrast, the rules of
Gesetz, ioi, and zakon are enacted. These are laws that get their
binding force not from their content but from their form. The critical
feature of their form is their pedigree: they must be enacted or declared
by a law-giver recognized as authoritative within the legal system.
The debate between positivists and their opponents turns on the exclusivity of enacted law within the system. As Thomas Hobbes, a
seminal positivist, put it: "It is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes
a Law."' 70 The opponents of positivism hold out for part or all of the
7
legal system as an expression of justice. '
The German legal tradition has positivist strains, as Kelsen's influential book, Die Reine Rechtslehre, reminds us. 7 2 Kelsen's positivism is simply stated: all Recht is enacted by an authoritative lawgiver. This strain has never been dominant in German thought, at
least not to the same extent that the positivist message of Hobbes,
Bentham, Austin, and Hart has commanded loyalty in the AngloAmerican tradition. German legal thought, particularly in the postwar period, seeks to foster a living sense of Right, a conception of
law that transcends the enacted legal materials.
Defining the Right by contrast to the positivist concept of law is
unhappily negative. It tells us only that the Right is not reducible to
the set of enacted laws. It is more difficult to say positively what the
Right is. For Kant, whose influence is still felt in German legal
thought, the Right is the set of conditions under which the choices of
each person can be reconciled with the choices of others, under universal laws of freedom. 3 Kant's account distinguishes clearly between
Right and morality. The former states the framework of freedom that
enables people with diverse purposes to live together in civil society.
70 T. HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON
LAvS OF ENGLAND 55 ( .Cropsey ed. 1971).
71 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 107-10 (1977) (arguing that principles

supplement but do not displace statutory law); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 647-51 (i958) (expressing the view that
legislative commands must be just in order to constitute law).
72 The oft-criticized translation into English is H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (M.
Knight trans. r967).
73See I. KANT, supra note 55, at 34. Unfortunately, Professor Ladd's translation of Kant
mistakenly renders Recht as "justice." See id.
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Morality addresses itself, more demandingly, to our duty to respect
74
the humanity in ourselves and in others.
Kant conceived of the Right as guaranteeing the security and
external freedom of everyone in civil society. 75

Provided that one

respects these spheres of autonomy in others, one is legally free to be
moral or not as one chooses. This legal freedom is expressed in the
view we plausibly attribute to Kant on the duty to rescue. The
categorical imperative commands that one rescue a person ip distress. 76 Yet the failure to do so does not violate the security or external
freedom of the person in danger. Therefore, the Right, construed
strictly, does not require one to rescue.
This narrow conception of the Right strongly resembles Rawls's
first principle of justice. 77 It seeks to guarantee the basic structure of

society without resolving the inevitable conflicts that occur in social
and economic life. 78 A twentieth-century conception of the Right
addresses itself to these conflicts and in the course of resolving them
strikes a compromise between the moral duty to protect the interests
of others and the autonomy secured by the basic structure. This

conception of the Right is expressed in the growing trend toward
legally imposed duties to aid others. 79 Another significant example is
the defense of lesser evils in torts and criminal law, a principle that
requires courts to decide when it is right for one individual to encroach

upon the less valuable interests of another.80 The person suffering
the invasion must forgo his otherwise rightful interests. This modern

conception of the Right thus compromises the values of security and
external freedom, trading off these aspects of personal autonomy

against other interests in an effort to resolve social conflict.
It is significant, however, that the traditional conception of the
Right still informs the law of self-defense. Section 32 of the German
criminal code provides:
74

See I.

KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

53-54 (L. Beck trans.

1959).
75 By virtue of this guarantee, individuals are obligated to enter into civil society and may
be compelled to do so. See I. KANT, supra note 55, at 65-66.
76 Cf. I. KANT, supra note 74, at 48-49 (discussing the duty to aid others).
77 See J. RAwLs, supra note 49, at 6o ("[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.').
78 Rawls regards these issues as beyond the scope of his book. Id. at 315.
79See, e.g., STGB § 13 (treating the duty to rescue as a matter of Right); Weinrib, The Case
for a Duty To Rescue, go YALE L.J. 247, 266-67 (ig8o) (relying on Kant's moral theory to
advocate a legal duty to rescue).
80 See, e.g., STGB § 34; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The
history of this defense - particularly as it bears on the theory of Right - has yet to receive
adequate exposition. The defense as applied to the sacrifice of interests other than property
entered German criminal law in the landmark decision of the Imperial Supreme Court, Judgment
of Mar. ii, 1927, Reichsgericht, Ger., 61 RGSt 242, 247-55 (under the circumstances abortion
held not wrongful).
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(i) Whoever commits an act required by self-defense acts not-wrongfully.
(2) "Self-defense" refers to a defense necessary to ward off an imminent wrongful attack from oneself or another.81
The term "wrongful," appearing in both provisions, means "contrary to Right." Only attacks contrary to Right trigger the privilege
or right of self-defense (including defense of self, of property, and of
others);8 2 the minimal force necessary to ward off a wrongful attack
is not contrary to Right. In the same context, American legislation
would use the term "unlawful, '8 3 a term that risks confusion between
law as the Right and law as reduced to enacted laws. In order to
capture the point of the German term, my translation relies on
"wrongful" as equivalent to "contrary to Right."
Limiting self-defense to warding off wrongful attacks means that
if an attack is not wrongful, one has no privilege to respond. The
attack itself might be justified on grounds of self-defense, in which
case section 32(1) tells us that it is not wrongful. Similarly, section
34 provides that attacks justified on grounds of lesser evils are not
wrongful. 8 4 It follows from the structure of these provisions that
justified attacks, which are not wrongful, do not generate a right
of self-defense. Recalling the distinction between wrongfulness and
blameworthiness, 8 5 however, we may infer that attacks excused on
grounds of insanity, duress, and personal necessity do generate a full
right of self-defense. 8 6 If the attack is merely excused, it is nonetheless
"contrary to Right" and warrants the full measure of resistance. On
this point there will be more to say later.
For present purposes, the important point is the failure of section
32, enacted in 1975, to incorporate the principle of proportionate force

as a limitation on the right of self-defense. Even though important
voices in the literature and the case law favored this limitation,8 7 the
code adopted the traditional German rule that all necessary force is
privileged. If deadly force is necessary to prevent the escape of a
81 STGB § 32 (author's translation).
82 The literal translation of the German term Notwehr would be "necessary defense."
83 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04()

(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

The Code makes an

inept effort to define "unlawful" in § 3.11(1). The definition is prolix primarily because the
drafters could not formulate a concept (like excuse) to describe defenses that even if successfully
asserted by an aggressor, would leave the unlawfulness of the attack unaffected.
84 See STGB § 34 (if the provision applies, the act is "not wrongful").
85 See supra pp. 50-59.
86 The dominant view in German law is that self-defense is allowed against excused aggression. See H. JESCHECK, supra note 2o, at 273. The Model Penal Code concurs, but without
a concept of excuse. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); supra
note 83. Some German scholars, however, have concluded that the right of self-defense does
not apply against excused aggression. See, e.g., E. SCHMIDHAUJSER, STRAFRECIT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 151-52 (2d ed. 1975).

87See sources cited supra notes 20-21.
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petty thief, the code permits it. The common argument for this
extreme position invokes a German maxim: Right need never yield to
Wrong.8 8 The very idea of being in the Right against an aggressor,
of having a personal right encroached upon, means that one is entitled
to resist. This is what it means to be an autonomous person in civil
society. As Kant would put it, resisting an aggressor in the name of
the Right reinforces the basic structure of civil society.8 9 Forcibly
repulsing the aggressor ensures that every individual may exercise his
freedom consistently with the exercise of a like freedom by others. 90
It follows, then, that the legal system should not require that individuals surrender their rights to aggressors rather than use the force
necessary to vindicate both their autonomy and the legal order.
Despite the wording of section 32, contemporary German theorists
would require the surrender of rights in some cases - particularly if
the aggressor is obviously drunk, an infant, or a member of the
defender's family. 9 t As noted earlier, the doctrinal rationale for this
restriction is that although the defender has a right to use all necessary
force, he "abuses" this right if he exercises it in certain cases. 9 2 What
should lead to this restriction on the vindication of personal autonomy?
At the outset we might say that some balancing is necessary between
the interests of the defender and the interests of the aggressor. Deadly
force- would be all right to prevent a rape, but not to avoid a kiss;
wounding the aggressor would be acceptable to prevent grand larceny,
but not to frustrate an illegal attempt to tie up a parking spot. 93 The
preliminary question, however, is why the defender, whose rights are
under attack, should be concerned at all about the interests of the
aggressor.
The answer, simply, is that the aggressor is a human being. Even
though he is engaged in wrongful aggression, one cannot treat him
simply as an intrusive force to be nullified at all costs. With its
exclusive emphasis on vindicating personal autonomy, the German
philosophy that Right need never yield to Wrong does indeed treat
the Wrong as a force always rightfully negated. The humanitarian
response is that sometimes the cost of defending the Right is simply
8 In German: Das Recht braucht dem Unrecht nicht zu weichen. The maxim dates back
at least to Berner, Die Notwehrtheorie, 1848 ARCHrV DES CRIMINALRECHTS 547, 557, 562.
89 Cf. L KANT, supra note 55, at 36 (the Right entails the authorization to use coercion
against anyone who violates the Right).
90 Id. at 36-37.

91 This is the standard line of the textbooks and treatises. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, supra
note 2o, at 277; A. SCHONKE, H. SCHRODER & T. LENCKNER, supra note 44, § 32, at 457. As

to attacks occurring within the family, see the supportive language in the Judgment of Sept.
25, 1974, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 28 NJV 62.
92 See cases cited supra note 21.
93 See Judgment of Jan. 22, x963, Oberlandesgericht, Bavaria, 16 NJW 824.
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too high; sometimes the Right must yield in order to preserve values
found even in the person of a wrongful aggressor.
The humanitarian response leads directly to the modern conception
of the Right, which incorporates the interests of the aggressor in
asserting the limits of rightful self-defense. One finds this modern
conception in Blackstone, 94 who argued that if we do not execute
petty thieves for their crimes, neither should we permit the use of
deadly force in resisting petty theft. The property owner should not
be able to react more severely on the street than does the sentencing
authority in the courtroom. Whatever the logical limits of. this analogy,95 it does support an integrated standard for self-defense: on a
single plane of argument, judgments about the merit of the defender's
position interweave with concern for the aggressor's interests.
In the dominant German approach to the problem, these two levels
are still kept distinct. The first level of the argument addresses itself
to the criteria of security and personal freedom, the values embodied
in the traditional conception of Right. The second level softens the
harshness of this absolutist view by introducing criteria of human
solidarity. In going from the first to the second level, we shift from
rights to interests. According to the Kantian view, the aggressor has
no right that a person exercising self-defense defer to his interests as
a human being. So far as Right requires the vindication of autonomy,
it is entirely on the side of the defender.
Those who would reject the recognition of humanitarian criteria
at a second level might argue as follows. Of course, the aggressor
has interests, but if Right is entirely on the side of the defender, then
it is up to the defender to decide whether to defer to the interests of
the aggressor. No victim is under a legal duty to exercise her privilege
of necessary defense; she may choose to be compassionate, but the
state has no rightful authority to force her to surrender her rights in
the name of altruism. 96 This is an important point, for it illuminates
the extent to which the coerced surrender of personal autonomy in
civil society does in fact reflect coerced altruism. The only disagreement would be whether it is the business of the state to ensure that
people act altruistically and compassionately, even toward wrongful
aggressors.
The same distinction between Right and compassion emerges in
analyzing the criteria that bear on claims of justification and excuse.
Looking at the converse side of these categories, we find that the
See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *181-82.
95 The analogy conflates the ex post response to a specific crime with the ex ante vindication
94

of autonomy. For a critique of this confusion, see Fletcher, Book Review, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
2099, 2112-14 (1983) (reviewing B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)).
96 On an analogous conflict between "individualism" and "altruism" in contract law, see
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
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analysis of wrongfulness raises questions of Right; the analysis of
blameworthiness, questions of compassion. If the defendant's conduct
is justified, it is not wrongful and the state's right to punish no longer
obtains. There is nothing that warrants punishment. If, in contrast,
the conduct is wrongful, the state does have a right to punish. 9 7 The
only question is whether, in view of the the exigent circumstances of
the act, compassion precludes exercising the right to punish.
Grounding excuses in compassion for the accused raises some difficult points. There is no doubt that under circumstances of duress,
personal necessity, unavoidable ignorance of the law, and mental
disturbance, wrongful actors deserve our compassion. Nonetheless, it
is difficult to speak of a judge who administers an institution like the
criminal law as having a duty to be compassionate. What if on the
day of trial, the sentencing judge happens to feel nothing - neither
outrage nor compassion for the allegedly excused offender? If taken
too seriously, this point would undermine the entire institution of
blame in the criminal law. Whether conduct is blameworthy can
hardly depend on whether the judge feels like blaming the defendant.
The judge's proper response is not to ask whether she feels like
blaming the defendant, but whether the defendant deserves blame.
The same mode of thinking comes to bear in assessing whether the
allegedly excused offender deserves compassion.
Further, the grounding of excuses in compassion raises the question
whether the person relying on the statutory excuse has a right to be
excused. It is hard to comprehend how the legal system could regularly engage in a particular practice without the beneficiaries of the
practice having a right to its benefits. This is particularly the case
where the practice is domesticated in legislated rules setting forth the
defenses. Defendants have a right that the courts follow the legislated
law, and in this sense they do have a right to be excused where a
legislated excuse properly applies.
The right to be excused, however, applies only against the courts.
It would be difficult to say that a defendant had a right at the time
of his act to engage in the wrongful act. Suppose we were to recognize
98
an excuse of personal necessity in a case like Dudley & Stephens.
Killing the ship boy and consuming his body would be wrongful, but
it would be unfair to expect ordinary people to starve to death for
fear of wrongdoing. The excuse would come into play ex post, at the
time of the trial. But ex ante, at the time of the act, it would be
implausible to speak of a right to kill the boy and of the boy's duty
to submit to the killing.
97

Kant argues that the state has both a right and a duty to punish offenders. The right is

grounded on the subject's "having committed a crime." I. KANT, supra note 55, at zoo. The
duty is grounded on the categorial imperative to respect the humanity of the offender. Id.
98 Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
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Further, if the excused actor had a right to do what he did, he
should have been able, consciously and deliberately, to rely on that
right at the time of acting. Relying on the expectation of a subsequent
acquittal, however, would undercut the element of compulsion necessary to constitute an excuse of personal necessity. Excuses apply
only where the wrongful conduct is attributable substantially more to
exigent circumstances than to the voluntary choice of the offender.
So far as the actor expects to be excused and acquitted, his conduct
takes on the contours of voluntary choice and planning. 99
To summarize the argument thus far, I have attempted to show
that the analysis of Right differs significantly from a secondary line
of analysis that invokes considerations of compassion and altruistic
concern for the interests of wrongdoers. In the field of necessary
defense, the notion of Right generates an absolute right to use the
force necessary to prevent wrongful aggression. In the analysis of
criminal liability, the concept of Right provides the threshold for
determining when conduct is wrongful and warrants punishment. In
both fields of inquiry, humanitarian considerations come to bear at a
secondary stage of analysis. In self-defense, these altruistic concerns
restrict the scope of defensive force permissible against petty intrusions. In the analysis of liability, compassion comes center stage in
the recognition of mitigating and excusing circumstances that reduce
or eliminate the punishment deserved by the wrongdoer.
Il. PUTATIVE SELF-DEFENSE: A CASE STUDY OF FLAT AND
STRUCTURED REASONING
The first two sections of this essay permit us to generalize tentatively about two styles of legal thought. One style is rooted in the
notion of reasonableness; the other, in the conception of Right. The
former generates flat legal rules that, with the inclusion of vague
modifiers, refer explicitly or implicitly to all the relevant criteria that
bear on a particular legal problem. The latter style of thought yields
structured tiers of legal argument, with the argument of Right occupying one tier and humanitarian considerations, a secondary level.
There is probably no area of the criminal law that better illustrates
the conflict between these two styles of thought than the problem of
putative justification, particularly the problem of putative self-defense.
Although most professors of criminal law in the United States and
England would easily understand the difference between justification
and excuse, few are likely to comprehend the label "putative selfdefense." This fact is itself significant. The phrase "putative self-

99This argument has paradoxical implications. See Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought,
85 COLUMt. L. RFv. (forthcoming i985).
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defense" is well known among criminal lawyers in Western 10 0 and
Eastern Europe, 10 1 the Soviet Union, 10 2 Latin America, 10 3 and Japan.104 That the English-speaking world departs from this pattern
should trigger our interest.
The phrase "putative self-defense" refers to the problems that arise
when someone reasonably believes that he is being attacked, but in
fact is not, and uses force against a person who is not in fact an
aggressor. The problem is whether in view of the actor's reasonable
belief, the use of force will support a charge of battery or, if the victim
dies, of homicide. The self-defense is called putative for it is not a
case of real self-defense, but of force used against a putative aggressor.
Suppose that Dan reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that Allan
is attacking him. The jurisdictions mentioned above concur that in
this situation of "putative self-defense," Dan's use of force cannot be
justified. Justification - harmony with the Right - is an objective
phenomenon. Mere belief cannot generate a justification, however
reasonable the belief might be. This is not to say that Dan has no
defense. He may rely on his mistake to defeat liability for his use of
force against the innocent Allan.' 0 5 Now, suppose that Dan, still
believing that Allan is attacking him, endangers Allan's life. Does the

100 See, e.g., G. BETTIOL, DiRrTo PENALE 347 (iith ed. 1982); R. MERLE & A. VITU,
TRAiTt DE DROIT CRIMINEL 517-18 (3d ed. 1978) (distinguishing between legitime defense
vraisemblable and legitime defense putative: the former is based on objective appearance and is
justified; the latter is based only on personal culpability); A. SCHONKE, H. SCHRODER & T.
LENCKNER, supra note 44, § 32, at 461 (2oth ed. i98o),
101 See, e.g., STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 408 (J. Lekschas & J. Renneberg eds. 1976)
(G.D.R.).
102 See, e.g., 2 KuRs SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA, supra note io,at 363-65.
103 See, e.g., L. JIMENEZ DE AsuA, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL 85 (2d ed. 1961) (la
defensa putativa discussed in passing).
104The Japanese term is gos6 bei ("mistaken defense'. See S. DANDO, KEIHO KOYO: SORON
["Textbook on Criminal Law: The General Part"] 221-23 (1979).
105 The treatment of this mistake is controversial under German law. The code recognizes

only two types of mistake: those that concern the factual elements of the offense and those that
concern the prohibited nature of the act. A faultless or negligent mistake about the elements
of the offense negates the intent required for intentional liability; such a negligent mistake will
support liability for negligence if a specific provision so stipulates. See STGB § i6.An unavoidable mistake about the legal status of an act negates the culpability required for conviction;
if the mistake is avoidable, it can only mitigate punishment. See STGB § 17. A mistake about
the factual presuppositions of self-defense falls between these statutory stools. It is neither a
mistake about the definition of the offense nor a mistake about the legal characterization of the
act. The tendency today is to extend § i6 by analogy to cover mistakes about the factual
presuppositions of self-defense. See Judgment of June 6, 1952, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen,
3 BGHSt io5; H. JESCHECK, supra note 20, at 375; G. STRATENWERTH, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL I, at 152-53 (3d ed. 198I). But see H. WELZEL, DAs DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT
x68 (izth ed. 1969) (classifying putative self-defense as a mistake about the wrongfulness of the
aggression). For a totally different approach to the problem, see E. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note
86, at 151 (arguing that the mistaken defender does not act wrongfully unless he sticks to his
action after being advised of the mistake).
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innocent Allan have a defense in response? Virtually everyone agrees
that Allan has a right to defend himself against the person mistakenly
trying to kill him. Dan's use of force is wrongful against Allan, and
therefore, under section 32(2) of the German criminal code, Allan
may use the minimal force necessary to ward off Dan's attack. In the
final analysis, both Dan and Allan could be acquitted; Dan on the
ground of faultless mistake and Allan, on the ground of self-defense.
The main propositions of this analysis are straightforward. First,
mistakes cannot justify homicide. Second, the mistaken actor may
rely only on his mistake; if the putative aggressor must defend himself,
he, as the innocent party, may justify his act on grounds of selfdefense. Yet these propositions do not present themselves as serious
possibilities to American legislative reformers. Following the recommendation of the Model Penal Code, 10 6 American legislatures routinely
equate reasonable belief in the existence of a justification with the
actual existence of the justification. 10 7 They collapse the problem of
putative self-defense into the analysis of actual self-defense. Therefore, in the case of Allan and Dan, the standard American response
is that Dan has a full right of self-defense against Allan and Allan
has a full right of self-defense against Dan. The reasonable is equated
with the justifiable. There could be no better proof that American
lawyers do not take seriously the distinction between justification and
excuse.

I am not sure whether this state of affairs in the United States
simply reflects a confusion that will, in the course of debate, work its
way clean, or whether it reflects a way of thinking that is so deeply
rooted in the American legal consciousness that efforts to clarify the
issue will always be branded as the importation of "German ideas."
In most of my work, I have argued for the former proposition. It is
worth considering, however, whether a legal system founded on reasonableness is likely to generate. the sharp distinction between objective justification and subjective belief required to distinguish between
actual and putative self-defense.
In order to approach these issues, I wish to reflect upon numerous
discussions with American academic lawyers, both in print and in
private exchanges, about two central propositions. Either of these
propositions, if accepted, would lead to the distinction between actual
and putative self-defense. The first proposition is that subjective belief
cannot by itself render conduct justified. Believing that defensive
force is rightful cannot, by itself, make it rightful.
One philosophical argument that subjective belief can justify conduct builds on a misreading of Kant's view that a good will is the
106 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(I), 3.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
107 See e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § I3-4 0 4 (A) (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-I

(Smith-Hurd 1972).
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highest conceivable good. 108 The good will is taken to be synonymous
with good intentions, and because the putative defender acts with
good intentions, his defensive conduct must be moral and is therefore
presumably justified. An argument of this sort is found in the work
of Charles Fried.' 0 9
This argument is flawed first in its reading of Kant's moral theory
and second in its attempt to link the moral theory with the criteria of
justification. According to Kant, the will is good only if one acts out
of a sense of duty, which means that the act is rendered necessary by
reverence for the moral law. 0 Let us suppose that the categorical
imperative (the moral law) requires us to defend the Right against
wrongful aggression.'11 This is our duty. It is conceivable that a
putative defender might act out of this sense of duty and that his will
would therefore be good. His conduct would be moral - in the
Kantian sense. There is no warrant, however, for equating a good
will in this special sense with good-faith intentions112 Nor is there
any basis for the logical leap from good will to the concept of justification. The notions of Right and of justification arise in legal theory,
which Kant properly keeps distinct from moral theory. 113 Morality is
a characteristic of our inner attitude," 4 but the Right is an objective
framework for regulating practical affairs in civil society. It seems to
misrepresent Kant to appeal to his moral theory in arguing about the
justification for killing an aggressor in the name of the Right.' n'
103 See I. KANT, supra note 74, at 9.
109 See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 48 (1978); see also Dressier, supra note 27, at 8o

(relying on Kant).
110 See I. KANT, supra note 74, at i9-2o.
M See I. KANT, supra note 5s, at 36.
112 Acting out of duty alone (that is, the will's being good) requires that no other motives
inform the action. The will cannot be good if self-interest or other sentiments motivate the
action, even in part. See I. KANT, supra note 74, at 17. Good intentions, by contrast, are
perfectly compatible with conscious self-interest or a feeling of fear in resisting the supposed
attack.
113

The mere agreement or disagreement of an action with the Right, without regard to
the incentive of the action, is called [legality]; but, when the Idea of duty arising from
the law is at the same time the incentive of the action, then the agreement is called the
[morality] of the action.
I. KANT, supra note 55, at 29 (translation amended by the author).
114 A great deal of confusion about Kant derives from the natural assumption that his use
of "morality" coincides with our use of the term today. One can never be moral in the Kantian
sense simply by conforming to a rule, even if that rule expresses deontological values. For
Kant, morality requires that the will be pure, which means that the act be free and that the
exclusive motive for acting be duty (reverence for the moral law). Kant concedes that a moral
act in this highly restricted sense may never have occurred. See I. KANT, supra note 74, at
23-24.
11s Perhaps one could argue that a killing in self-defense would be moral if the actor executed
the killing solely because it was his legal duty to do so. See supra note 114. But self-defense
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Furthermore, the argument that good intentions can justify our
actions clearly proves too much. It would establish that the goodfaith use of defensive force is always justified. Even an unreasonable,
good-faith belief in the necessity of defensive force would establish
that the will is good. It should take more than a misreading of Kant
to convince us that good faith is equivalent to the Right. Yet the
contrary view, that a principled distinction separates justified conduct
from the mistaken perception of justifying circumstances, has yet to
take hold even in sophisticated quarters of American legal thinking.
The second proposition that could lead us to the distinction between actual and putative self-defense derives from a claim about the
nature of justified conduct. The claim is that in any situation of
physical conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us
from recognizing that more than one of the parties could be justified
in using force. I shall refer to this proposition as the "incompatibility
thesis."
In the conflict posed above between Dan and Allan, the only
plausible way under the Model Penal Code of protecting Allan against
Dan's mistaken self-defense would be to recognize a privilege in Allan
also to use defensive force." 6 The problem is whether this defensive
response should be regarded as justifiable. Most commentators and
colleagues seem to think that there is nothing implausible about rec7
ognizing that both sides to the conflict are privileged or justified."
These theorists do not even balk at saying that both sides could have
a right to use defensive force. Indeed, when I argue this point, I
rarely find colleagues who agree with me that only one side can be
justified, only one side can be in accordance with the Right and have
a personal right to use force. There is an obvious difficulty in any
argument based upon conceptual analysis. My argument must rest
on our common understanding of the concepts of justification and
rights. It is embedded in our language, I would say, that incompatible
actions cannot both be justified. In any situation of conflict, one or
the other must be in the Right and have the right to act. But if I
cannot convince my audience about the ordinary meaning of our
is not regarded as a legal duty today (there are no legal consequences of choosing to suffer the
invasion), and I am reluctant to attribute this view to Kant. One might argue, however, that
there is a duty to defend the Right against aggression, precisely as there is a duty to punish.
See I. KANT, supra note 55, at 36.
116 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Generating a defense from
this provision is, in fact, not so easy. In order to invoke the privilege of self-defense, the actor
must (i) believe that defensive force is immediately necessary (2) to protect himself 'against (3)
unlawful force. If Allan knows that Dan is mistaken, it is hard to see how he could believe
that Dan's attack is unlawful, for Dan's force would not be unlawful under § 3.04, coupled
with § 3.I1(1).
117 See C. FRIED, supra note io9, at 48 (in the case supposed, in which Allan defends
against Dan's mistaken attack, Fried concludes "we will have a fight between two persons, both
acting justifiably. This is unfortunate but in no sense a contradiction . .
").
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language, there is little that I can say to prove my point. I must take
refuge in the larger issues that surround the debate.
Several factors might explain the willingness of thoughtful American commentators to speak of both parties to a dispute as having
rights or being justified. Any of the following beliefs might be operative, and indeed operative in different degrees and in different combinations, among American theorists.
A. Justification as Synonymous with "Defense"
Quite possibly, American lawyers incline toward thinking of a
justification as synonymous with any operative substantive defense
recognized by law. They might think of a justification as a claim to
be interposed ex post in appealing to a court not to convict. Of
course, every justification and excuse could be conceptualized exclusively as a reason for not convicting the defendant. But the criteria
of justification are supposed to function not only ex post as decision
rules, but ex ante as conduct rules. 1 18 In an ideal state of affairs,
everyone who contemplates harmful action could know whether her
conduct is rightful. She need not guess how courts will subsequently
evaluate the circumstances.
The prospect of knowing the law without judicial instructions
reflects an ideal of a self-regulating criminal law. It is an ideal with
anarchistic overtones. It suggests a body of norms rooted not in
legislation, but in the tacit understandings of the community. From
this perspective, claims of justification appear not as claims against
courts, but primarily as claims of individuals against one another.
In order to think of justifying claims in this way, we must suppose
that in a situation of conflict - say, Dan versus Allan - the struggling
parties might argue about their claims instead of acting them out.
They could make arguments and counter-arguments about who was
in the wrong and who ought to desist from the struggle. This is
conceptually untenable in the case of Allan's resisting Dan's mistaken
self-defense, for by hypothesis Dan cannot tell Allan about the mistake. But if the ideal is the hegemony of the Right even prior to
legislation, then all conflicts should, in principle, lend themselves to
resolution. Every struggle comes to be seen as conflict between the
Right and those who, by their acts, set themselves opposed to it.
The concept of justification is best understood as an expression of
this ideal of self-regulation. Struggling parties should, in principle,
be able to determine for themselves whose conduct conforms to the
Right and whose does not. There is little evidence, however, that
this ideal informs contemporary American legal theory. We are in118 See generally Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. R~v. 625, 637-48 (1984) (exploring the distinction between ex
ante conduct rules and ex post decisional rules).
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clined to think of the entire criminal law as coercion imposed from
above, as the product of intervention by police, prosecutors, and
judges. If we think of the criminal law as dominated and defined by
these official decisions, then of course we would be inclined to think
of all defenses as appeals to officials. And there is no reason why
officials, charged with finding reasonable solutions to practical problems, cannot find that two people in conflict - Dan and Allan
both have acted reasonably and therefore "justifiably."
B. Justification as Permissible Conduct
Another argument against the "incompatibility thesis" emerges
from the sensible classification of actions into the rightful, the permissible, and the excusable. Self-defense and, particularly, lesser evils
are better thought of not as rightful, but as permissible actions. There
is indeed support for this view in German legislation, which labels
these justificatory claims as not-wrongful rather than rightful." 9 German theory repeatedly stresses the distinction between conduct that
falls outside the scope of the criminal law, such as killing a fly, and
justifiable conduct that nominally violates the law, such as killing in
self-defense. 120 The philosopher Judith Thomson highlights this distinction by treating justifiable conduct as the infringement of a protected interest but not a violation of that interest. 12 1 That cases of
justifiable conduct are nonetheless infringements suggests that it is
perhaps not correct to think of these acts as rightful.
The concept of the permissible enters to fill the apparent gap
between the rightful and the wrongful. The common law notion of
privilege also seems to capture this ambivalent middle ground. All
reasonable options become privileged and permissible. Thus, the conduct of both Dan and Allan could be regarded as permissible, and,
in this sense, justifiable. If that is all the claim of justification means,
the incompatibility thesis must give way to a multiplicity of permissible actions.
The best argument against the view that justifiable conduct is
merely permissible derives from the same thought experiment we used
in assessing the view that claims of justification are merely appeals to
courts. According to the ideal of the criminal law as a self-regulating
set of conduct rules, the rules must generate a solution ex ante for
every case. The "permissible" flows from a skepticism about the
possibility of a single solution. It favors a limited range of reasonable
outcomes. The notion of the permissible thus has no place in this
idealized system of self-regulation. It follows that the incompatibility
119 See STGB §§ 32, 34.
120 See, e.g., H. WELZEL, supra note 1o5, at 81.

121 Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, ig ARiz. L. RE:v. 45, 47-49 (1977).
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thesis can find no support in the reduction of justifiable conduct to
the merely permissible.
C. Rights as Prima Facie Rights
German lawyers think of rights as absolute, although subject to
defeasance on grounds of "abuse."'1 22 An absolute right occupies the
available moral space. It is logically impossible for someone resisting
the assertion of a right also to have a right. If a mother has a right
to abort a fetus, the fetus cannot also have a right to be born. If a
convict has a right to leave a burning jail, a guard cannot also have
a right to keep him confined. If Dan has the right to use force against
Allan, Allan cannot also have the right to use force against Dan. This
strikes me as the natural way to speak about rights. The impossibility
of inconsistent rights seems implicit in the grammar of rights discourse. So far as justifications generate rights, therefore, the impos23
sibility of inconsistent justifications follows.1

It is not clear, however, that Americans think about rights in this
way. There is a good deal of talk about rights "trumping" utilitarian
incursions against the interests of right-bearers.1 24 But the advocates
of rights in contemporary jurisprudence typically concede that the
rights themselves are "trumpable," or susceptible to being overridden
in extreme cases. The innocent have a right not to be punished, but
this right might be "trumped" by the necessity of saving the nation
from a maniac who threatens to bomb us unless we punish a designated person. 125 We have a constitutional right to free speech, but
this right might be "trumped" by a "clear and present danger" to the
body politic. That rights can be "trumped" in this way is expressed
by saying that the rights are merely "prima facie."126
There are at least two distinct interpretations of what it means to
say that a right is prima facie, one interpretation for each of the
modes of legal thought I have attempted to articulate. The advocates
of a structured approach to rights insist that even if the right is
trumped or overridden, we should retain a sense of loss in witnessing
the overriding of the right. 12 7 The right remains intact, even though
122 This point holds only for the traditional conception of Right. The modern conception,
discussed on p. 966, treats rights as relative rather than absolute.
123 This conclusion receives some support in J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 72 (1973).
124 See, e.g., R. DWORPKN, supra note 71, at xi.
12S See Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT at xi, xvii (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
126 The doctrine of "prima facie" duties originated, apparently, in W. Ross, THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD 55-56 (293o). That rights could be "prima facie" in the sense that when
infringed, they no longer exist, is criticized in A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 15 (1977).
127 See H. MORRIS, supra note 56, at 55-56 (stressing that when a person is not accorded a
right, the right is nonetheless infringed); cf. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
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our common sense tells us that we must make sacrifices under exigent
circumstances, such as sacrificing an innocent person in order to save
the nation. The other interpretation appeals to the advocates of flat
legal analysis. That a right is prima facie means that it occupies only
a portion of the single plane of moral argument. When one right fails
to govern the resolution of a particular dispute, another right on the
same plane of moral space prevails. Once the right is trumped, it has
no force at all. This, I take it, is the way many people think about
overriding the right to free speech on the basis of clear and present
danger to the common good.
If justifications generate prima facie rights in the first, structured
sense, it would seem that the incompatibility thesis would still hold
at the first level of analysis. But if "prima facie" is understood in the
second sense of flat legal argument, there would seem to be no logical
impediment to recognizing that both the mother and the fetus, both
the escaping prisoner and guard, have prima facie rights. These rights
would conflict but would still co-exist. In order to resolve the conflict,
we would have to override one person's right and allow the other
person's to prevail. Yet the basis for overriding the right is not that
the other person's right is superior, for that would be to recognize
that the latter party indeed had an absolute right. The trumping of
a prima facie right is likely to turn on criteria of prudence and social
interest - indeed whatever criteria rendered the right prima facie
rather than absolute.
It is worth eliciting an additional ambiguity in talk about prima
facie rights. The modifier "prima facie" could refer either to the
degree of evidence about the existence of an absolute right, or to the
nature of the right itself. When I say that a mother has a prima facie
right to abort, I could mean: "I am not convinced that the mother
has a right to abort on these facts, but there is a prima facie case
made on her behalf." Or I could mean: "The right she has is qualified
in its very nature." The former view, based as it is on the partial
state of the evidence, would be compatible with the belief in absolute
rights. The latter view is the one we need for the claim that after all
the evidence is in, both the mother and the fetus have prima facie,
but nonetheless conflicting, rights.
The divergence of common law thinking from continental thinking
on putative self-defense derives from a matrix of interrelated assumptions. American lawyers tend to think of all available legal defenses
as analogous, tend to assume that what is permissible is justified, and
tend to view rights as trumpable claims. At the foundation of these
assumptions lies the cement of reasonableness, a concept that enables
20 (1968) (in cases of strict liability, where fault is not an issue, we have "the sense that an
important principle has been sacrificed").
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Americans to blur distinctions between objective and subjective, selfdefense and putative self-defense, wrongdoing and responsibility.
IV. MONISM AND PLURALISM IN LEGAL THEORY

Although the Right and the reasonable lead us in different directions in criminal theory, the two concepts have much in common.
They both represent efforts to transcend the sources of positive law
and to reach for a higher, enduring, normative plane. Kelsen to one
side, 128 German thought clearly recognizes the Right as the inexhaustible repository of ultimate truth about justice in civil society. A vivid
sense of Right is expressed in the post-war West German constitution,
which holds that judges are bound not only by enacted and customary
law, but also by the Right. 12 9 We express the same point by reasoning
that judges abide not only by enacted rules, but by principles of
130
morality and justice.
As the Right is not reducible to enacted laws, reasonableness is
not reducible to a finite set of rules. As we know from the "stoplook-and-listen" cases in tort law, 131 no set of rules can determine
what is reasonable in all situations. Nor does reasonableness lend
itself to definitive specification on the basis of custom or of market
practices. 13 2 We do not always know what the reasonable requires,
but working with this open-ended concept at the core of our legal
system saves us from the constricting effects of positivism. Whatever
philosophers may argue, we know that the rule of law means more
than the law of rules.
Although both the Right and the reasonable permit the ongoing
infusion of moral values into the law, these two architectonic concepts
impose different structures on the legal order. The Right stands for
a monistic legal order, for the existence of one right answer in every
legal dispute. The Right requires us to believe that only one party
can be justified in any situation of conflict. The reasonable, in contrast, urges us in the direction of a pluralistic legal order. Perhaps
only one side can be in accordance with the Right, but both disputants
might be reasonable. Both sides might indeed be justified.
Understanding this divergence between the Right and the reasonable helps us to fathom the deeper structure of the debate between
H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin over discretion in the legal process.
It is no accident, in my view, that in explaining why judges invariably
have discretion in applying the law, Hart relies on the paradigmatic
128 See H. KELSEN, supra note 72.
129 See GRUNDGESETZ § 20(3) (V. Ger.).
130 See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 71, at 28-31.
131 See, e.g., Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (i934).
132 See The T.J. Hooper, 6o F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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example of negligence and reasonable care. 133 The standard of reasonableness invites consideration of diverse normative criteria in resolving the dispute. It does not, however, necessarily point to a single
right answer. If there are several reasonable solutions to a particular
dispute, then there is no way to decide between them but by judicial
exercise of choice or discretion. A pluralistic legal order mandates
discretion. As Hart states his conclusion: "[T]here is no possibility of
treating the question raised by the various cases as if there were one
uniquely correct answer to be found, as distinct from an answer which
134
is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting interests."
To counter Hart's thesis, Dworkin seeks recourse in modes of legal
thought found, as well, in continental thinking.135 First, he develops
a model of structured legal argument. His favorite case is Riggs v.
Palmer,13 6 which raises the question whether a designated heir of a
murdered testator may nonetheless take under a will. The rule holds
that everyone properly designated in a will has a right to inherit.
This rule appears to be absolute; but in fact, the rule is subject to
defeasance on another plane of analysis: the plane of principle or of
Right. 13 7 If the defendant murders the testator, the relevant principle
on this second plane is that no one should profit from his own wrong.
By stressing that principles of Right are accepted or rejected on
grounds of their intrinsic appeal rather than the pedigree of their
enactment, Dworkin effectively undermines the positivist assumption
that all law is reducible to enacted law.
Invoking this mode of structured argument, however, is not
enough to rebut the thesis that judges exercise discretion in interpreting and applying the law. Needed in addition is a commitment to a
monistic legal order. If there is a single truth of the matter and judges
are obligated to discover that truth, then they cannot exercise a choice
between reasonable alternatives. 138 The thesis eventually emerges in
Dworkin's work that there is a right answer in every dispute, however
difficult the answer may be to discover.139 In another version of the
133 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129-30 (I96i).
134 Id. at 128.
135 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 14.

136 i5 N.Y. 5o6, 22 N.E. x88 (1889).
137 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 22-31 ("principles" function, like the Right, as the
law beyond the enacted law). Dworkin's two-stage analysis, applying rules, then principles,
should not be confused with the structured division between the Right and humanitarian
considerations.
138 See id. at 36.
139 See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 58, 84 (P. Hacker
& J. Raz eds. 1977) ("[There will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.").
While conceding that Dworkin is almost universally understood to claim that one of the parties
in every hard case has a right to a decision in his favor, Leon Gallis reads Dworkin's claim to
be merely that one of the parties might have a right. See Gallis, The Real and Unrefuted Rights
Thesis, 92 PHIL. REV. 197, 200-01 (1983).
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same monistic strain, Dworkin argues that there is one best fit of the
authoritative legal materials to a particular case and one best interpretation of these materials. 140 Whatever turn this monistic argument
takes, the thrust of Dworkin's work is to elaborate a theory of Right
in American law.
The conflict between pluralism and monism, between reasonableness and Right, replicates itself on the level of methodology in legal
theory. Should we assume that there are many different, equally
plausible theories of criminal law? Is the common law solution to the
problem of putative self-defense just as sound as the German solution?
Or should we be committed to monism in searching for the single best
theory of criminal law that transcends particular legal cultures? Comparative legal theory might illuminate our understanding of diverse
legal styles. But, to my mind, it would be an intellectual tragedy to
take the concepts of style or of culture as a limitation on possible
modes of argument. Should we say to Dworkin: "You cannot argue
for a single right answer in the context of the common law. We think
differently here"? A reference to culture is not an argument. That a
particular mode of thought has been ascendant for a century or two
tells us nothing about how we might think a century from now. My
own view is that as a descriptive matter, our legal culture might
incline us in a particular direction. The task of philosophical argument is to arrest this inclination and to establish a common basis for
discourse that enables us to transcend our particular conventional
practices. It is not the task of culture to legitimate argument. It is
the task of argument to legitimate - or to delegitimate - culture.
140 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 116-17.

